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AVOIDING THE INEQUITIES CREATED BY IN RE DELCO 
OIL, INC.—THE NEED FOR AN INNOCENT VENDOR 
EXCEPTION 
ABSTRACT 
In In re Delco Oil, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether a chapter 7 
trustee can avoid a debtor’s unauthorized transfer of cash collateral to a 
vendor that transacts in good faith and for equivalent value. The Eleventh 
Circuit strictly interpreted 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 and 550 by holding that the 
trustee has the power to avoid such a transfer. This decision is problematic for 
two reasons. First, the innocent vendor had to forfeit the goods that it 
transferred and any cash collateral received in exchange. Second, the decision 
created an absurd result by preventing the innocent vendor from obtaining an 
administrative expense claim even though it conferred a benefit on the estate. 
This decision effectively prevents an innocent vendor from receiving any 
compensation for the sale of its goods. 
This Comment argues that an innocent vendor exception would prevent the 
negative consequences resulting from Delco and further the goals of 
bankruptcy. It supports this position in several ways. First, it examines the 
absurd results caused by Delco and the relevant legislative history of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Second, it surveys the sizable burden that Delco places on 
vendors before engaging in transactions. Third, it analyzes other ways in 
which the court can police the debtor’s unauthorized use of cash collateral. 
Fourth, it examines the extent of § 105 and other case law to delineate the 
authority to create such an exception. 
An innocent vendor exception would ensure an equitable result in cases 
analogous to Delco because it would prevent an innocent vendor, as an 
innocent transferee, from receiving a double penalty due to the debtor’s 
misconduct. Furthermore, such an outcome would be consistent with the goal 
of § 550, which is to put the estate in the same position it would have been had 
the transaction not occurred. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The reasoning underlying chapter 11 is that it is generally preferable to 
continue to operate and reorganize a troubled business rather than to liquidate 
it.1 In light of this goal, it is important for the business to preserve its assets for 
equitable distribution to its creditors.2 The preservation of assets, however, 
may create problems for innocent third parties. Consider a scenario where a 
vendor enters into an agreement with a company through which the vendor 
will provide goods in exchange for cash. Unbeknownst to the vendor, the 
company it is selling goods to is in chapter 11 bankruptcy and pays the vendor 
with its cash collateral.3 To make matters worse, there may be restrictions on 
the company’s use of cash collateral. If the company’s chapter 11 
reorganization is converted to chapter 7 liquidation, the appointed trustee may 
seek to avoid the payment made to the vendor with the cash collateral. It seems 
clear that the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) authorizes such an avoidance under 
§ 549, which allows the trustee to avoid an unauthorized transaction made 
postpetition.4 But an avoidance in this case is far from equitable, as the estate 
receives a windfall and the vendor is unable to receive compensation for the 
transfer. 
Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), is the most 
recent case dealing with the issue of whether an unauthorized transfer of cash 
collateral by a debtor in possession, who paid for goods used in its ordinary 
course of business, can be avoided under § 549(a) of the Code.5 In this case, 
the Eleventh Circuit determined that a chapter 7 trustee could avoid a debtor’s 
transfer of cash collateral made to an “innocent vendor.”6 The court came to 
this ruling even though the vendor acted in good faith and arguably exchanged 
the goods for equivalent value.7 As a result of this ruling, the vendor was 
forced to forfeit both the cash consideration it received and the inventory it 
transferred to the company.8 
 
 1 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2009). 
 2 See id. 
 3 See infra Part I.C. 
 4 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 549–550 (2012). 
 5 Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 6 An “innocent vendor” is a vendor that “received cash collateral for value, in good faith and without 
knowledge of the voidability of the transfers.” Id. (citing Hankin v. Mersey Mold & Model Co. (In re 
Countryside Manor, Inc.), 239 B.R. 443, 447 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999)). 
 7 See id. 
 8 Id. 
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Delco has received its fair share of criticism, mainly due to the punishment 
it imposed on a vendor who dealt in good faith and merely exchanged valued 
goods in return for payment from a debtor.9 These innocent vendors are 
oftentimes not aware that the company they do business with is in bankruptcy, 
nor are they aware that the company may be using cash collateral to pay for 
goods without proper authorization.10 Notwithstanding the inequity resulting 
from Delco, the Eleventh Circuit asserted that there was no other way to police 
§ 363(c)(2) of the Code, which prohibits a debtor’s use of cash collateral 
without court authorization.11 
The court added that §§ 549 and 550 did not explicitly include an “innocent 
vendor” exception.12 The court’s plain meaning interpretation of §§ 549 and 
550 is another important critique of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, because 
this approach arguably led to an absurd result.13 By strictly interpreting §§ 549 
and 550, the court prevented an innocent vendor from obtaining an 
administrative expense claim from the estate, and effectively rendered the 
innocent vendor’s claim unsecured.14 Additionally, the court failed to address 
whether the secured creditor or the estate was entitled to receive the avoided 
funds.15 
There are ways to avoid these absurd results. Other courts have addressed 
this issue without resorting to the plain meaning interpretation of §§ 549 and 
550, and have instead considered other factors to determine whether 
unauthorized payment of cash collateral should be avoided.16 These courts 
looked beyond the plain meaning of the statute, and considered whether injury 
to the estate occurred, and whether the result was inequitable and contrary to 
the purpose of the Code.17 
 
 9 See id. (doubly punishing the vendor by causing a loss of not only received cash collateral, but also the 
inventory it had initially transacted to the debtor). 
 10 Id. (citation omitted). 
 11 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (2012); Delco, 599 F.3d at 1263. 
 12 Delco, 599 F.3d at 1263. 
 13 See Rashad L. Blossom & Jennifer H. Henderson, In Re Delco Oil, Inc.—A Cautionary Tale for 
Vendors Doing Business with Chapter 11 Debtors, 72 ALA. LAW. 223, 225, 227 (2011). 
 14 The innocent vendor should have an administrative expense claim in accordance with § 503 of the 
Code, but § 502(h) prevents this from happening by allowing avoidance of the transfer via § 549(a); thus, since 
the trustee recovers under § 550, the innocent vendor’s claim is transformed into a prepetition unsecured claim 
under § 502(h). See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(h), 503; infra Part II.B.2.b. 
 15 See Delco, 599 F.3d at 1257. 
 16 Abbott v. Arch Wood Prot., Inc. (In re Wood Treaters, L.L.C.), 479 B.R. 122, 129 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
2012); Rushton v. Bank of Utah (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 465 B.R. 226, 230–31 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011), aff’d, 
477 B.R. 176 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012). 
 17 Wood Treaters, 479 B.R. at 129; C.W. Mining, 465 B.R. at 242. 
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Additionally, the result of Delco runs contrary to the goals and underlying 
policy of chapter 11. It places a sizable burden on vendors to investigate 
whether the company it conducts business with is in chapter 11, and if it is, 
whether it has proper authorization to use cash collateral.18 Performing this due 
diligence can be costly and may discourage vendors from conducting further 
business with companies in reorganization.19 
This Comment will advocate for a judicial exception for innocent vendors 
in narrow circumstances similar to Delco—where a vendor transacts in good 
faith and for equivalent value with debtors that paid with cash collateral 
without proper authorization. This will prevent the negative consequences that 
result from Delco. Part I of this Comment will discuss some relevant 
provisions of the Code. Part II of this Comment will first discuss Delco to 
understand the court’s analysis. Second, it will introduce the criticism that 
followed Delco and assess its validity. More importantly, this section will 
delve into the absurd results of Delco. Part III of this Comment will consider 
the burden that Delco imposes on vendors, and how this burden will likely 
affect the way vendors will deal with chapter 11 debtors in the future. Part IV 
will show that, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Delco, there are 
other ways of policing § 363(c)(2). Part V of this Comment will show 
alternative ways courts can avoid the negative consequences caused by Delco. 
First, it will analyze cases similar to Delco, where a party looks to avoid a 
postpetition transfer, to demonstrate that there are other ways to deal with 
unauthorized postpetition transfers of cash collateral by a debtor. Second, it 
will look to the authority that courts can use to exempt innocent vendors from 
§§ 549 and 550. More specifically, it will show how courts can draw authority 
from § 105 of the Code to prevent the problems from the Delco decision. 
Finally, Part VI will analyze how the proposed exception will further the goals 
of Code and prevent the absurd results created by Delco. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A better understanding of §§ 549 and 550 and cash collateral, as well as 
their respective purposes, is essential to understanding the consequences that 
result from punishing innocent vendors under § 549(a). The avoidance and 
 
 18 Jonathan Friedland & Bill Schwartz, Punishing the Innocent: Lessons from Delco Oil, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., May 2010, at 1, 89. 
 19 See id. 
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recovery provisions provided by the Code under §§ 549 and 550 were created 
to prevent harm to the estate caused by postpetition transfers.20 
A. Section 549(a) 
Section 549 is an avoidance provision that allows the trustee or debtor in 
possession to avoid unauthorized postpetition transfers of property of the estate 
with the goal to “pursue as equal a distribution of assets to creditors as 
possible.”21 “To avoid means to make void [or] annul.”22 The purpose of this 
section is to prevent postpetition transfers of the debtor’s property from 
diminishing the estate.23 Section 549(a) states: 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, the 
trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the estate — 
(1) that occurs after the commencement of the case; and 
(2) (A) that is authorized only under section 303(f) or 542(c) of 
this title or by the court; or 
(B) that is not authorized under this title or by the court.24 
This provision has been widely applied, even when there is fraud by the debtor 
or good faith on part of the transferee.25 
B. Section 550(a) 
Section 550(a) works in conjunction with § 549(a) to promote one of the 
main goals of bankruptcy law—to preserve the estate’s assets for an equitable 
distribution to creditors.26 Once a transfer has been avoided under § 549(a), 
§ 550(a) provides: 
(a) except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a 
transfer is avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 
553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the trustee may recover, for the 
benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so 
orders, the value of such property, from — 
 
 20 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 549–550 (2012). 
 21 Id. § 549; Gonzales v. Nabisco Div. of Kraft Foods, Inc. (In re Furrs), 294 B.R. 763, 775 (Bankr. 
D.N.M. 2003) (citing Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990)). 
 22 C.W. Mining, 465 B.R. at 231 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 23 5 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 549.02 (citations omitted). 
 24 11 U.S.C. § 549. 
 25 5 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 549.02 (citations omitted). 
 26 See Abbott v. Arch Wood Prot., Inc. (In re Wood Treaters, L.L.C.), 479 B.R. 122, 126 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 2012). 
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(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose 
benefit such transfer was made; or 
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial 
transferee.27 
Therefore, the purpose of § 550(a) is to “restore the estate to the financial 
condition it would have enjoyed if the transfer had not occurred.”28 
Accordingly, its focus “is not on what the transferee gained by the transaction 
but rather on what the bankruptcy estate lost as a result of the transfer.”29 To 
achieve this purpose, the “overwhelming majority of courts interpret the phrase 
‘benefit of the estate’ liberally, holding that the property or its value may be 
recovered even if creditors have been paid in full under a plan.”30 
C. The Importance of Cash Collateral 
A company undergoing chapter 11 reorganization is oftentimes deprived of 
cash.31 The use of any available funds could be the difference between the 
company failing or surviving the reorganization period.32 In an effort to obtain 
cash, the debtor may even be forced to sell some of its encumbered assets.33 
The Code defines the proceeds of the encumbered assets as cash collateral.34 
More specifically, cash collateral is defined as “cash and cash equivalents” in 
which both “the estate and [another entity] have an interest.”35 
Even though cash collateral could provide much needed cash for 
reorganization efforts, the Code imposes certain restrictions on a debtor’s use 
of cash collateral.36 Although the Code allows the debtor in possession—as 
trustee of the estate—to use the available funds of the estate so long as it is in 
 
 27 11 U.S.C. § 550. 
 28 Rushton v. Bank of Utah (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 465 B.R. 226, 233 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 477 B.R. 176 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012). 
 29 Id. 
 30 5 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 549.01 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 31 See Donald T. Polednak, Is the Secured Creditor Really “Secure”?: A Survey of Remedies and 
Sanctions for a Debtor’s Unauthorized Use of Cash Collateral in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 
344, 346 (1992). 
 32 See id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (2012). 
 35 Id. (“‘[C]ash collateral’ means cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title, securities, deposit 
accounts, or other cash equivalents whenever acquired in which the estate and an entity other than the estate 
have an interest and includes the proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits of property and the fees, 
charges, accounts . . . whether existing before or after the commencement of a case under this title.”). 
 36 See id. § 363(c)(2). 
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the ordinary course of business, those rights are restricted when the debtor in 
possession is using cash collateral.37 Section 363(c)(2) prohibits the use of cash 
collateral, even during the ordinary course of business, unless the debtor in 
possession obtains consent from either the secured creditor, or authorization 
from the bankruptcy court after notice and hearing.38 
This restriction attempts to balance the conflicting interests of the debtor in 
possession and the secured creditor.39 While secured creditors run the risk that 
their collateral will be consumed, the chapter 11 debtor is short on cash and 
probably needs to use the cash collateral to rehabilitate its business.40 By 
allowing the debtor in possession to use cash collateral only after the secured 
creditor’s objections (if any) have been heard, § 363(c)(2) protects the secured 
creditor’s priority status and the property interest in the collateral should the 
cash collateral be spent.41 Unfortunately for the debtor in possession, this 
restriction may prove too great a hurdle if it does not have the resources to 
reorganize without the use of the cash collateral.42 
Unsurprisingly, a debtor in possession may still choose to use cash 
collateral without authorization, and in such an event, the Code fails to provide 
a specific penalty for debtors or a remedy for injured secured creditors.43 
 
 37 Id. 
 38 Section 363(c)(2) states: 
(2) The trustee may not use, sell, or lease cash collateral under paragraph (1) of this subsection 
unless— 
(A) each entity that has an interest in such cash collateral consents; or 
(B) the court, after notice and a hearing, authorizes such use, sale, or lease in accordance 
with the provisions of this section. 
 39 See Polednak, supra note 31, at 346. 
 40 See id.; John C. Chobot, Enforcing the Cash Collateral Obligations of Debtors in Possession, 96 COM. 
L.J. 136, 143 (1991) (“Once cash collateral has been dissipated and spent, court-fashioned sanctions such as 
retroactive protection, appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee or prohibitions against the further use of cash 
collateral can be hollow victories for a secured creditor and do not rise to the level of a ‘remedy’. This is 
especially true where all remaining property of the estate is encumbered and the cash which has been spent 
without permission cannot be replaced.”) (quoting Williams v. Am. Bank of the Mid-Cities, N.A. (In re 
Williams), 61 B.R. 567, 575 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986)). 
 41 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2); Polednak, supra note 31, at 346. 
 42 Polednak, supra note 31, at 347. 
 43 Chobot, supra note 40, at 137 (citing Mercantile Nat’l Bank at Dallas v. Aerosmith Denton Corp. (In 
re Aerosmith Denton Corp.), 36 B.R. 116, 119 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983)). 
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II. ANALYSIS: IN RE DELCO OIL, INC. AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
In Delco, the Eleventh Circuit dealt with the issue of whether a chapter 7 
trustee may avoid the postpetition transfer of cash collateral by a debtor in 
possession under § 549(a) of the Code.44 This decision harms innocent vendors 
because it prevents them from recovering the goods they exchanged and forces 
them to forfeit the cash collateral that was paid to them.45 This Part walks 
through the Delco opinion and then discusses its negative ramifications. 
A. The Delco Opinion 
1. Facts 
Delco Oil, Inc. (Delco) was a distributor of motor fuel and associated 
products.46 As part of its motor fuel business, Delco entered into a sales 
agreement with Marathon Petroleum Co. (Marathon) in 2003 to purchase 
petroleum products.47 In 2006, Delco entered into a financing agreement with 
CapitalSource Finance (CapitalSource), in which Delco pledged as collateral 
all rights to its personal property, including collections, cash payments, and 
inventory, to CapitalSource.48 
On October 17, 2006, Delco filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy and requested 
authorization to use CapitalSource’s cash collateral to continue its operations.49 
The next day, the bankruptcy court authorized Delco to continue its business as 
a debtor in possession, but did not make a decision regarding Delco’s request 
to use its cash collateral until November 6, when it denied Delco’s request.50 
But between October 18 and November 6, Delco had made $1.9 million in 
cash distributions to Marathon.51 
Later that year, the case was converted to a chapter 7 case and a trustee was 
appointed by the bankruptcy court.52 The trustee then filed an adversary 
proceeding against Marathon to avoid the postpetition distributions made to 
Marathon under § 549(a), on the basis that Delco did not have the 
 
 44 Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 45 See id. at 1257. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
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authorization from the secured creditor or bankruptcy court as required by 
§ 363(c)(2).53 The bankruptcy court ruled in the trustee’s favor, and the district 
court affirmed.54 
2. Marathon’s Arguments 
On appeal in the Eleventh Circuit, Marathon made three arguments for why 
the payments it received were not avoidable under § 549(a).55 First, Marathon 
argued that the funds it received from Delco did not constitute CapitalSource’s 
cash collateral under Florida’s version of § 9-332(b) of the U.C.C.56 The 
statute provides that “[a] transferee of funds from a deposit account takes the 
funds free of a security interest in the deposit account unless the transferee acts 
in collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.”57 
Marathon relied on this statute to argue that once distributed, the cash-
collateral it received from Delco became free of CapitalSource’s security 
interest because Marathon did not act in collusion with Delco.58 The cash 
transfer, Marathon argued, had lost its status as cash collateral.59 
Second, Marathon argued that even if the funds constituted cash collateral, 
the distribution received is not avoidable because any violation of § 363(c)(2) 
did not harm CapitalSource or the estate.60 In other words, Marathon claimed 
that because the funds it received from Delco were equivalent in value to the 
inventory exchanged, CapitalSource’s interest was not diminished since it had 
a perfected security interest in Delco’s personal property.61 
Finally, Marathon argued that an “implicit” defense exists under § 549 for 
ordinary course transfers and for innocent vendors who deal with a debtor in 
possession.62 Marathon claimed that this implicit defense exists as a matter of 
 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 1259–62. 
 56 Id. at 1259 (citing FLA. STAT. § 679.332(2) (2002)). 
 57 Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 679.332(2) (2002)). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 1262; Brief of Appellant at 39, Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 
F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-11759), 2009 WL 1512875 (“Accordingly, to recover under section 549(a) 
the secured party must establish that its interest in the collateral has ‘declin[ed] in value.’”) (citing In re 
Sterling Dev., Inc., No. 11-08-14208, 2009 WL 196250, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.M. Jan. 26, 2006)). 
 61 Delco, 599 F.3d at 1262. 
 62 Id. at 1262–63. 
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policy.63 Marathon dealt in good faith and was not aware that Delco’s cash 
payments were not authorized. Marathon stated that it was unreasonable to 
require vendors to investigate whether their customers have permission to 
utilize their cash collateral in postpetition payments.64 
3. The Court’s Analysis and Decision 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected all of Marathon’s arguments.65 With regard 
to Marathon’s first argument, that the funds it received did not constitute cash 
collateral, the court stated that U.C.C. § 9-332(b) had no bearing on the 
following dispositive facts: “(1) The Bankruptcy Code prohibited the transfer 
to Marathon altogether, because CapitalSource had a perfected security interest 
in [Delco’s] cash proceeds while they were in [Delco’s] hands, and (2) the 
Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee to avoid and take back unauthorized 
transfers.”66 The court stated that it is beside the point that CapitalSource did 
not have a security interest in the funds after Delco transferred them to 
Marathon.67 The court added that to “determine whether the funds constitute 
cash collateral,” one must examine “the status of the funds while they were in 
[the] [d]ebtor’s hands before the disputed transfer . . . not at the moment after 
the funds left [the] [d]ebtor’s control.”68 
As to Marathon’s second argument, that there was no harm to the estate or 
to CapitalSource, the court focused on the plain meaning of § 549. The court 
concluded that a “harmless exception to a trustee’s [§] 549(a) avoiding power 
does not exist,” and that “all [a trustee] needs to demonstrate to avoid the 
transfer under [§] 549(a) is: (1) an unauthorized transfer occurred; (2) the 
property transferred was property of the estate; and (3) the transfer occurred 
[postpetition].”69 The court added that § 549 “does not require any analysis of 
 
 63 Id. at 1262. 
 64 Shane G. Ramsey, Avoiding the Pitfalls of In re Delco Oil, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2011, at 62. 
 65 Delco, 599 F.3d at 1257–63. 
 66 Id. at 1260 (stating that CapitalSource may recover the funds Delco transferred to Marathon not 
because the creditor continued to have a security interest in those funds, but “because Debtor was not 
authorized to transfer the funds to anyone postpetition without the permission of CapitalSource or the 
bankruptcy court”). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. (citations omitted) (adding that if the status of the funds were to be examined after they left the 
debtor’s control, it would allow a debtor to circumvent section 363(c)(2) of the Code, as in such case the 
proceeds would not be defined as cash collateral). 
 69 Id. at 1262. 
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the adequacy of the protection of secured creditors’ interests nor does it 
provide a harmless error exception.”70 
Finally, the court rejected Marathon’s third argument that an implicit 
defense exists under § 549 for ordinary course of business transfers made by 
innocent vendors dealing with a debtor in possession.71 The court sought 
guidance in the language of subsections 363(c)(1) and (2). Noting that 
subsection 363(c)(2) set a specific limitation on a debtor in possession’s 
express ability to use cash collateral derived from § 363(c)(1), the court 
concluded that Congress “did not intend to allow the use of cash collateral 
without the permission of the interested secured creditor or the bankruptcy 
court, even if used in the ordinary course of business.”72 Referring to the plain 
meaning of §§ 549(a) and 550, the Eleventh Circuit stated, “Congress knew 
how to create exceptions based on [the] transferee’s status and culpability,” 
and added that “it chose not to do so when it came to initial transferees of 
[postpetition] transfers of cash collateral.”73 
B. Criticism of Delco 
Delco has been heavily criticized.74 The most relevant point to this 
discussion is the fact that an innocent vendor received a double penalty—
losing both the cash collateral and a claim to the transferred inventory—for 
receiving cash collateral without knowledge that the chapter 11 debtor had no 
authorization to do so.75 This result stems from the Eleventh Circuit’s plain 
meaning interpretation of § 549.76 In addition, the court did not rule on whether 
Delco could use the cash collateral it had at the time Delco transferred the 
funds to Marathon.77 This Section will review the court’s analysis in allowing 
 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 1262–63. 
 72 Id. at 1263. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 225 (“Delco Oil creates terrible problems for the trial courts, 
lawyers and vendors who must apply the Court’s ruling.”); Friedland & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1 (“Delco 
seems to be a bad decision . . . . We get the need for a court to interpret the Bankruptcy Code as written, but 
the bankruptcy court (and perhaps one of the two appellate courts) could have done that and still have ruled the 
other way.”). 
 75 Delco, 599 F.3d at 1263. 
 76 Id. (“To avoid a transfer under Section 549(a) a trustee need only demonstrate: (1) a postpetition 
transfer . . . (3) which was not authorized by the Bankruptcy Code or the court . . . Congress knew how to 
create exceptions based on transferee’s status and culpability. But it chose not to do so when it came to initial 
transferees of postpetition transfers of cash collateral.”) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (2012)). 
 77 Id. 
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the chapter 7 trustee to avoid Delco’s unauthorized transfer of cash collateral, 
and delineate how the court, by strictly construing § 549(a), brought about an 
absurd result. 
1. The Court’s Plain Meaning Interpretation 
The plain meaning approach is a default rule of statutory interpretation.78 In 
fact, looking at the plain meaning of a statute is “the most obvious and perhaps 
the most objective focal point to determine what the law requires.”79 This 
reasoning comes from the idea that a statute, when read plainly, depicts “what 
our elected representatives intended . . . the law to mean.”80 
But many cases illustrate that the plain meaning interpretation of a statute is 
not always the optimal approach, because its use may bring about an absurd 
result.81 This is largely due to the fact that statutory interpretation is a “holistic 
endeavor.”82 Although the “plain meaning of legislation should be 
conclusive . . . [there are] ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a 
statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its 
drafters.’”83 If this is the case and an absurd result occurs, “then the intention 
of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.”84 Additionally, the 
Supreme Court has stated that “even when the plain meaning did not produce 
absurd results but merely an unreasonable one ‘plainly at variance with the 
policy of the legislation as a whole,’” the Court should follow that purpose, 
“rather than the literal words.”85 
 
 78 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 223 (2000). 
 79 Id.; see also Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966) (“There is, of course, no more 
persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give 
expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the 
legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning.”) (quoting United States v. Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)). 
 80 ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & GARRETT, supra note 78. 
 81 Am. Trucking, 310 U.S. at 543 (stating that the plain meaning of a statute is followed when words are 
sufficient to determine the purpose of the legislation, but when that meaning leads to absurd results, the court 
has looked “beyond the purpose of the act”). 
 82 United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988). 
 83 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 
Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966) (quoting American Trucking, 310 U.S. at 
543). 
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2. The Absurd Results 
In rejecting Marathon’s argument that the trustee could not avoid the 
payments because Delco’s violation of § 363(c)(2) did not cause harm to the 
estate, the Eleventh Circuit stated that “a ‘harmless’ exception to a trustee’s 
§ 549(a) avoiding powers does not exist.”86 The court added that § 549 “does 
not require an analysis of the adequacy of protection of secured creditors’ 
interests [or provide] a harmless error exception.”87 The court explained that 
there were two exceptions within § 549, but neither of those exceptions applied 
in this case and that if Congress wanted to add an exception for innocent 
vendors, then they would have done so.88 
The Eleventh Circuit’s plain meaning reading of § 549 in Delco brought 
about two absurd results, which are discussed in detail below.89 First, it is not 
clear whether the secured creditor or the estate is entitled to the avoided 
funds.90 Second, the court failed to address whether an innocent vendor is 
entitled to an administrative expense claim upon return of the avoided 
payment.91 Due to the court’s failure to address these issues, the innocent 
vendor has to return the cash it received from the debtor, and forfeit the goods 
it transferred without compensation. 
a. Where Do the Avoidable Funds Go? 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision failed to address whether the secured party 
or the estate should receive the funds recovered from the avoidance.92 This is 
important because if a court were to follow Delco, it would have to decide 
whether the lender or the estate is entitled to the funds recovered from the 
postpetition avoidance. But either result would be problematic.93 
 
 86 Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255, 1262 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(“Congress created two exceptions to a trustee’s Section 549 avoiding powers. First, subsection (b), which 
involves only involuntary bankruptcy cases and, second, subsection (c), which protects good faith purchasers 
of real property. As this is a voluntary bankruptcy involving the transfer of cash in exchange for personal 
property, neither exception provided by Congress applies.”). 
 87 Id. at 1262. 
 88 Id. at 1262 n.3, 1263. 
 89 See Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 224–26; Friedland & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 89. 
 90 Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 226. 
 91 Id. at 227. 
 92 Id. at 226. 
 93 Id. 
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If the estate is entitled to the recovered funds, then the estate would receive 
a windfall.94 Given that the innocent vendor transferred equivalent value for 
the cash collateral it received, the estate would be able to keep both the 
recovered cash collateral and the goods it had transacted for.95 This is where 
the inequity arises, because the estate arguably received the equivalent value 
for the cash collateral transferred to the vendor and was not harmed in the first 
place.96 This result therefore would allow the trustee to use an avoidance 
provision meant to restore the estate to the condition it would have been in had 
the transfer not occurred, when the estate did not actually suffer harm.97 Due to 
this, chapter 7 trustees will have an incentive to avoid similar postpetition 
transactions in an effort to increase the value of the estate. 
If a court were to return the recovered funds from a § 549(a) avoidance to 
the lender instead of the estate, other difficulties arise.98 Returning the 
recovered funds to the lender would be contrary to the language of § 550, 
which grants the trustee the power to recover property transferred from a § 549 
avoidance as long as it is for the benefit of the estate, not for the benefit of the 
secured creditor.99 This is also inconsistent with the goal of § 550, which is to 
restore the estate to the financial condition it would have been in had the 
transaction not occurred.100 The goal and language of § 550 suggest that a 
secured creditor should not directly benefit from a chapter 7 trustee’s 
avoidance motion. What makes this more problematic is that in a case like 
Delco, the innocent vendor received the funds free from any liens that the cash 
collateral would have had while in possession of the debtor.101 As a result, the 
trustee’s recovery for the benefit of the lender would not only be inconsistent 
with the Code, but would also be contrary to the priority rules established by 
the U.C.C.—under which the innocent vendor, as a transferee, took possession 
of the cash collateral free from a security interest.102 
 
 94 Id. (allowing for avoidance of a transfer under 549(a), to an innocent vendor prior to conversion to 
chapter 7, results in the estate keeping both the cash collateral transferred and the funds). 
 95 See id. (stating that other creditors are the ones who receive the windfall, as they will receive money 
from the estate). 
 96 See id. 
 97 See Rushton v. Bank of Utah (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 465 B.R. 226, 233 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011), 
aff’d, 477 B.R. 176 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012). 
 98 Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 226. 
 99 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2012). 
 100 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 101 Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 227 (citation omitted). 
 102 U.C.C. § 9-332(a) (2001) (“A transferee of money takes the money free of a security interest unless the 
transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.”). 
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Interpreting Delco plainly, it doesn’t matter whether the court orders the 
recovered funds to be transferred to the estate or to the lender, because either 
action would bring about an absurd result that is either contrary to the purpose 
of the Code, or contrary to the rules of priority in the U.C.C. 
b. The Right to an Administrative Expense Claim 
The Eleventh Circuit also failed to address whether Marathon was entitled 
to an administrative expense claim.103 This is important because even though 
the vendor lost the cash collateral it received from the debtor in possession, the 
vendor’s transfer of goods still benefitted the estate.104 Section 503 states that 
allowed administrative expense claims shall include, “the actual, necessary 
costs and expenses of preserving the estate.”105 Section 503 is interpreted as 
requiring that the expense not only be “‘actual’ and ‘necessary’, but also that 
there be a concrete benefit to the debtor’s estate.”106 Given that Delco received 
petroleum products in exchange for the cash collateral it gave to Marathon, 
there is no doubt that those goods benefitted the estate. Therefore, pursuant to 
§ 503, the vendor should be entitled to an administrative expense claim by 
conferring such benefit to the estate.107 By obtaining an administrative expense 
claim, the vendor’s claim would have priority over prepetition unsecured 
claims.108 
Although the vendor should be entitled to an administrative expense claim, 
the vendor’s ability to do so is jeopardized by the court’s strict interpretation of 
§ 549(a).109 This is due to a conflict arising between §§ 502(h) and 503.110 
After moving to avoid the postpetition transactions to Marathon under 
§ 549(a), the trustee proceeded to recover the cash collateral from the innocent 
vendor via § 550.111 Section 502(h) states that a “claim arising from the 
recovery of property under” § 550 shall be treated the same as a prepetition 
claim.112 Thus, § 502(h) has the effect of transforming what should be an 
 
 103 Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 227. 
 104 See 11 U.S.C. § 503; infra text accompanying note 106. 
 105 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A). 
 106 In re Beverage Canners Int’l Corp., 255 B.R. 89, 92 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000) (citation omitted). 
 107 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3); see Beverage Canners, 255 B.R. at 92. 
 108 See 11 U.S.C. § 507. 
 109 See Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 225, 227. 
 110 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(h), 503. 
 111 Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255, 1257–59 (11th Cir. 2010); 
see 11 U.S.C. § 550. 
 112 11 U.S.C. § 502(h). 
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administrative expense claim under § 503 for the innocent vendor, into an 
unsecured prepetition claim.113 This absurd result further highlights the burden 
that is imposed on innocent vendors and is yet another reason why the court 
should have created an innocent vendor exception for Marathon in Delco. 
c. Legislative History 
The conflict between §§ 502(h) and 503 may have resulted from the way in 
which §§ 549 and 550 were rewritten from the previous bankruptcy statute. 
However, it seems unlikely that Congress intended to create a statute that 
effectively penalizes innocent vendors for receiving cash collateral, by 
preventing them from recovering the value of the goods transferred through an 
administrative expense claim. Furthermore, the history of §§ 502(h) and 550 
demonstrates that Congress may not have considered the consequences of 
including postpetition transfers among the types of transfers that may be 
recovered under § 550.114 
The current version of § 550 combines “parallel sections under prior law 
defining the rights and liabilities of transferees when the transfers under which 
they acquired property of the debtor were avoided.”115 This change was meant 
to separate “the concepts of avoidability of transfers and the liability of and 
recovery from transferees and to consolidate the rules respecting liability and 
recovery in § 550.”116 By consolidating the rules respecting liability and 
recovery in § 550, it is unlikely that the drafters of the Code foresaw that in 
certain circumstances, such as those demonstrated by Delco, that avoiding 
postpetition transfers under § 550 may produce an absurd result.117 
Accordingly, Congress may not have foreseen that the inclusion of § 549, as a 
provision under which a trustee can recover property for the benefit of the 
estate under § 550, would effectively give postpetition transfers the same 
treatment as unsecured claims.118 
The legislative history of § 502(h) also offers compelling support for the 
theory that Congress did not foresee a conflict between § 502(h) and § 503. 
 
 113 Id.; Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 227. 
 114 See 4 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 502.LH[10]. 
 115 5 id. ¶ 550.LH. 
 116 Id. 
 117 With the exception of § 549, which avoids postpetition transfers, every transfer that is recoverable 
under § 550 is a prepetition transfer. 11 U.S.C. §§ 549–550; see 5 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 550.LH. 
 118 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(h), 549(a), 550. 
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The reach of § 502(h) was not always as broad as it is today.119 In fact, the 
scope of § 502(h) was limited to § 547 in earlier versions of bankruptcy reform 
legislation: 
A claim arising from the recovery of property under § 550 of this title 
as a result of the avoidance under § 547 of this title of a setoff shall 
be determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) 
of this section, or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this 
section, the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the 
filing of the petition.120 
The earlier version of § 502(h) gave prepetition status only to claims arising 
from the recovery of property that results from an avoidance of a setoff under 
§ 547.121 Accordingly, the corresponding § 547 granted the trustee the power 
to avoid preferential transfers.122 
Although expanding the reach of § 502(h) further clarified the statute,123 it 
is unlikely that Congress predicted that, by expanding § 502(h) to include 
claims arising from recovery of an avoided transfer under § 550, postpetition 
transfers of cash collateral would be treated the same as prepetition claims. 
This result precludes innocent vendors from obtaining even an administrative 
expense claim.124 It is unlikely that Congress would intentionally penalize an 
innocent vendor by preventing them from obtaining an administrative expense 
claim even when it conferred a benefit on the estate. 
 
 119 4 COLLIER, supra note 1,  ¶ 502.LH[10]. 
 120 Id. (quoting S. 2266, 95th Cong. § 502(h) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, July 1989); H.R. 
8200, 95th Cong. § 502(h) (as passed by the House, February1978)). 
 121 4 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 502.LH[10]. 
 122 Id. 
 123 See id. 
In thus expanding [§] 502(h) in the enacted version of H.R. 8200, [§] 502(h) is closer to the third 
proviso of [§] 57n of the 1898 Act. As [§] 502(h) is drawn . . . it is unnecessary to draw the 
distinction drawn by [§] 57n of the 1898 Act between a claim arising by reason of the recovery 
by the trustee of money or property or the avoidance by the trustee of a lien on property of the 
estate held by such person. 
Id. 
 124 Congress may not have foreseen that by including § 549 as one of the sections through which recovery 
can be sought via § 550, a claim would later be treated as a prepetition unsecured claim by § 502(h) and thus 
be in direct conflict with permitting the vendor from obtaining an administrative claim for benefits conferred 
on the estate. See id. (stating that § 549 is the only section avoiding postpetition transactions through which 
recovery can be obtained in § 550). 
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III.  BURDEN ON INNOCENT VENDORS 
A direct result of Delco is that vendors, unaware that the company with 
which they do business is in bankruptcy, may lose inventory by transacting 
with the debtor who pays using cash collateral.125 Thus, Delco imposes upon 
vendors a significant burden to investigate whether the companies they deal 
with are in bankruptcy, and if so, to further inquire whether such companies 
have authority to spend any cash collateral they might possess.126 This burden 
discourages vendors from transacting with companies that are in chapter 11 
because it imposes an economic cost for vendors to fulfill their due diligence, 
and as a result may delay the speed in which transactions are made.127 This 
Part of the Comment will examine how Delco increases the cost of making 
transactions for vendors, thereby reducing a vendor’s incentive to engage in 
business with companies in chapter 11. 
A. Performing Due Diligence 
There are certain steps a vendor must take to avoid suffering the same fate 
as Marathon. The first step a vendor would take to protect itself from the 
“inequitable results” arising from the Delco decision is to monitor the credit of 
all the companies with which it is doing business to determine whether they 
have filed a petition for bankruptcy protection.128 
Second, and more importantly, the vendor would have to learn whether the 
debtor has the authority to pay for the vendor’s goods.129 To do this a vendor 
would need to check the docket for any bankruptcy proceeding that the debtor 
may have filed, and if the debtor does file for bankruptcy, make sure there is an 
appropriate order giving the debtor sufficient authority to pay for services.130 
 
 125 See generally Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 
2010). 
 126 Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 227. 
 127 See Friedland & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 89; Charles M. Oellermann, Caveat Vendor: Eleventh 
Circuit Rules That Unauthorized Payments by DIP Using Cash Collateral Must Be Disgorged, JONES DAY 
(Sept./Oct. 2010), http://www.jonesday.com/caveat-vendor-eleventh-circuit-rules-that-unauthorized-payments-
by-dip-using-cash-collateral-must-be-disgorged-09-30-2010/ (“Any vendor that receives postpetition payments 
from [the debtor in possession] is well advised to ensure that the [debtor in possession] has the requisite 
creditor consent or court authority to make the payments . . . Absent such an assurance, vendors may refuse to 
deal with a [chapter 11 debtor] whose assets are substantially encumbered.”). 
 128 Ramsey, supra note 64, at 63. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Daniel F. Gosch, I Have to Give What Back? Are You Serious? How to Deal with the In re Delco Oil 
Decision, DICKINSON WRIGHT (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.dickinson-wright.com/I-Have-To-Give-What-
Back-Are-You-Serious-How-To-Deal-With-The-Delco-Oil-Decision-10-20-2010. 
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But the mere existence of an order is not dispositive in determining whether 
the debtor has the authority to pay a vendor.131 In fact, the vendor must spend 
even more resources to ensure that it is adequately protected.132 This is because 
a cash collateral order may have provisions limiting the use of the debtor’s 
cash collateral in one way or another.133 The “budget” that is attached to an 
order usually defines the categories for which the debtor may use cash 
collateral.134 However, even if an order defines these categories, the definitions 
can be too generic or too narrow, and the vendor may need a second opinion to 
determine whether their order is covered.135 
Furthermore, a vendor would need to monitor whether the cash collateral 
order is terminated.136 Termination of a cash collateral order may occur when 
the order reaches a termination date, when the debtor defaults on a chapter 11 
payment, or when a creditor files a motion to terminate the debtor’s permission 
to use cash collateral.137 Therefore, “[a]bsent finding some specific language in 
a cash collateral order specifically addressing this termination issue when [the 
vendor has] it reviewed, [the vendor] will need to monitor the case docket on 
an ongoing basis.”138 This requires careful monitoring, which may 
substantially reduce the risk of dealing with an unauthorized debtor. On the 
other hand, such careful monitoring would increase the cost of dealing with 
chapter 11 debtors.139 If a vendor finds through due diligence that a debtor did 
not have authorization to use its cash collateral, then the vendor must try to 
stop any shipment of goods to the debtor, which could be quite costly.140 
B. Dealing with Executory Contracts 
Although vendors can stop the shipment of goods to a company that they 
know has no permission to use its cash collateral, this option may not always 
be available.141 An example of this situation arises in executory or service 
 
 131 Id. 
 132 See id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. (“A more generic budget may be better for [the vendor] than a more specific one, since a budget 
that has a line described as ‘suppliers’ arguably covers everyone supplying goods to the debtor.”). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 See Ramsey, supra note 64, at 63. 
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contracts.142 In these types of contracts, the vendor would consider using state 
law remedies mirrored from the U.C.C.143 For example, under § 2-609 of the 
U.C.C., “if a vendor has reasonable grounds for insecurity about the debtor’s 
ability to perform its obligations under a sales contract, the vendor may 
demand that the debtor provide adequate assurance of its ability to perform 
under the contract.”144 In service contracts, Article 2 of the U.C.C. is 
inapplicable, but § 251 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts has been 
adopted in some jurisdictions and can be used to seek relief.145 Another option 
for the vendor is to make a motion under § 365(d)(2) and try to compel the 
debtor to assume or reject the executory contract.146 
The constant monitoring of the bankruptcy proceedings by the vendor will 
not only eat away at the vendor’s resources, but will also likely delay the speed 
at which transactions occur between the vendor and the debtor in possession.147 
This will discourage vendors from doing business with debtors that are in 
chapter 11.148 Additionally, the delays in transactions are likely to hurt the 
debtor’s ability to succeed in its attempt at reorganization. Transaction delays 
will translate into long periods of time in which the debtor in possession will 
not have the necessary materials to continue doing business when the debtor is 
in a vulnerable state. Therefore, the burden placed on vendors as a result of 
Delco is contrary to one of the main goals of chapter 11, which is to encourage 
vendors to do business with debtor companies, and help enable their 
reorganization.149 
IV.  OTHER WAYS TO DEAL WITH THE DEBTOR’S UNAUTHORIZED USE OF 
CASH COLLATERAL 
The Delco decision focused on the need to police debtors and keep them 
from violating § 363(c)(2) by using cash collateral without permission from the 
 
 142 Id. at 63, 100. 
 143 Id. at 100. 
 144 Id. (citing U.C.C. § 2-609 (2004)). 
 145 Id. at 63, 100. 
 146 Id. at 100 (citation omitted) (“Although such a motion is unlikely to be granted at an early juncture in 
the case, a vendor could use such a motion as an opportunity to obtain a court order approving the payments to 
it pending the debtor’s decision to assume or reject the contract.”). 
 147 See Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 227. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id.; see Dill v. Hall & Assocs. (In re Indian Capitol Distrib., Inc.), No. 09-11558-s7, slip op. at 31 
(Bankr. D.N.M. Oct. 5, 2011). 
MENDOZA GALLEYSPROOFS2 3/5/2014 9:10 AM 
2013] AVOIDING THE INEQUITIES OF IN RE DELCO OIL 277 
secured creditor or the bankruptcy court.150 The court suggested that if this 
policing did not occur, then a debtor could distribute the cash collateral and 
render the security interest “virtually meaningless.”151 But avoidance of the 
debtor’s unauthorized use of cash collateral is not the only way of policing 
§ 363(c)(2), as there are other tools that may be more effective in preventing 
debtors from using cash collateral without authorization.152 More importantly, 
these alternatives do not affect the commercial dynamic between vendors and 
debtors.153 This Part will consider possible alternatives that may be used to 
deter debtors from using cash collateral without proper authorization as 
outlined in § 363(c)(2). 
In Delco, the chapter 7 trustee brought an avoidance action to recover cash 
collateral that a debtor in possession transferred without authorization while 
the case was in chapter 11.154 This is worth noting because the trustee sought to 
avoid Delco’s postpetition transfer of cash collateral while keeping the 
inventory it had obtained from the transaction.155 As a result, the secured 
creditor benefited when it recuperated the cash collateral spent by the 
debtor.156 The court justified its decision by pointing out the need to police a 
debtor in possession’s misuse of cash collateral.157 In circumstances similar to 
those in Delco, there are other means for a court to remedy the debtor’s misuse 
of cash collateral, such as granting a secured creditor a higher claim for the 
value of the cash collateral lost, without sacrificing the payment made to the 
vendor.158 The Code, however, is silent as to what specific penalty or sanction 
should be imposed upon a debtor who misuses cash collateral.159 In the 
absence of statutory guidance, bankruptcy courts have applied different 
remedies and sanctions.160 
 
 150 Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2010); 
Friedland & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 88. 
 151 Delco, 599 F.3d at 1261. 
 152 Friedland & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 88. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Delco, 599 F.3d at 1257. 
 155 Id. 
 156 See id. 
 157 Id. at 1261. 
 158 See Polednak, supra note 31, at 360. 
 159 See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012); Chobot, supra note 40, at 137; Polednak, supra note 31, at 344–45 
(citation omitted) (“Despite the importance of cash collateral to both the debtor and secured creditor, the 
[Code] appears indifferent as to the proper use of cash collateral. Furthermore, the [Code] fails to provide 
secured creditors with clear protection against a debtor’s misuse of cash collateral.”). 
 160 Chobot, supra note 40, at 141. 
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Giving the lender a replacement lien is one of the most common remedies 
courts use when a debtor uses cash collateral without authorization.161 Granting 
the secured creditor a replacement lien would remedy the secured creditor’s 
position by granting the secured creditor a lien on any new unencumbered 
property the debtor obtains, placing the secured creditor in the same position it 
was in prior to the transaction.162 Replacement liens seem like an equitable 
solution because it re-instates the lender’s secured status and allows the debtor 
to continue to have the opportunity to reorganize. However, this remedy may 
not always be available because the debtor may not have new unencumbered 
property at that moment.163 
An example of a granted replacement lien occurred in In re Aerosmith 
Denton Corporation.164 In this case, the debtor in possession converted about 
$13,000 of encumbered prepetition accounts into cash and commingled them 
in bank accounts, effectively washing away the identity of the cash.165 The 
bank sought a replacement lien on the debtor’s postpetition accounts and the 
imposition of penalties.166 The court determined that the $13,000 constituted 
cash collateral and that the debtor in possession misused the cash collateral, 
thereby violating § 363(c)(2).167 The court granted the creditor a replacement 
lien on the debtor’s postpetition accounts to secure the misused $13,000, and 
supplemented it with an administrative expense claim.168 The court also noted 
that the Code does not explicitly provide remedies or sanctions for a debtor’s 
misuse of cash collateral.169 However, the court cited to § 105 as giving it 
authority to grant the replacement lien, stating that the “[c]ourt does have an 
obligation to carry out the intent of Congress in its enactment of the 
[Code].”170 
 
 161 Polednak, supra note 31, at 360. 
 162 Id. (citation omitted). 
 163 Id.; Chobot, supra note 40, at 141, 143 (“Once cash collateral has been dissipated and spent, court-
fashioned sanctions such as retroactive protection, appointment of a [c]hapter 11 trustee or prohibitions against 
the further use of cash collateral can be hollow victories for a secured creditor and do not rise to the level of 
‘remedy’. [sic] This is especially true where all remaining property of the estate is encumbered and the cash 
which has been spent without permission cannot be replaced.”) (quoting Williams v. Am. Bank of the Mid-
Cities, N.A. (In re Williams), 61 B.R. 567, 575 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986)). 
 164 Chobot, supra note 40, at 142. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. (citing Mercantile Nat’l Bank v. Aerosmith Denton Corp. (In re Aerosmith Denton Corp.), 36 B.R. 
116, 117 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983)). 
 167 Id. (citing Aerosmith, 36 B.R. at 117). 
 168 Id.  
 169 Id.  
 170 Id. (citing Aerosmith, 36 B.R. at 119). 
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Giving “super priority status” on the portion of the funds misused by the 
debtor is another common remedy for secured creditors injured by the 
unauthorized use of cash collateral.171 To grant the creditor this remedy, the 
court derives authority from §§ 364(d) and 507(a).172 “By drawing an analogy 
between the debtor’s receipt of new funds from a lender and the debtor’s 
unauthorized use of cash collateral, the bankruptcy courts in effect treat the 
injured secured creditor like a lender who has given a [postpetition] loan on 
previously encumbered collateral.”173 Thus, the portion of collateral that was 
misused is given “super priority status” by making that amount an 
administrative expense claim pursuant to § 507(a).174 Hence, the payment for 
the recovery of lost funds is virtually guaranteed.175 
In addition to replacement liens and the grant of super priority status, there 
are other ways to discourage debtors from violating § 363(c)(2). For example, 
misuse by the debtor of cash collateral in violation of § 363(c)(2) may 
constitute a bankruptcy crime under title 18.176 Additionally, compensatory 
sanctions can be given to the officers and others who control a debtor that uses 
cash collateral without proper authority.177 Officers of a debtor company that 
uses cash collateral without authorization may face serious penalties, such as 
personal liability for conversion.178 For this reason, any officer that participates 
in the unauthorized use of cash collateral may be jointly and severally liable 
for conversion, and a monetary judgment may be rendered against him.179 
These tools are preferential to the method adopted in Delco because they create 
a disincentive for debtors tempted to misuse cash collateral, and do not hurt 
innocent vendors.180 
 
 171 Polednak, supra note 31, at 361 (citation omitted). 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. at 362. 
 174 Id. 
 175 See id. (citation omitted). 
 176 Friedland & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 89. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 177 Friedland & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 88. 
 178 Dean P. Wyman, Cash Collateral: The Risks of Non-consensual Use, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 1999, 
at 12 (“Conversion is the ‘wrongful exercise of dominion and control over another’s property in denial of or 
inconsistent with his rights.’”) (quoting Amarillo Nat’l Bank v. Komatsu Zenoah Am., Inc., 991 F.2d 273, 274 
(5th Cir. 1993)). 
 179 Id. 
 180 See Friedland & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 89. 
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V. HOW CAN COURTS AVOID THE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF DELCO? 
This part addresses the authority courts have to create an exception for 
innocent vendors. This authority derives from two concepts in the Code. First, 
courts have avoided interpreting § 549 in a plain meaning manner. Second, 
courts can draw authority from § 105 to exempt innocent vendors from the 
inequities resulting from the avoidance of postpetition transfers like those in 
Delco. 
A. Different Treatment by Other Courts 
In the wake of Delco, some courts have treated the avoidance of a debtor in 
possession’s unauthorized postpetition transfers differently.181 Although these 
cases had similar facts, the courts did not apply the same strict interpretation of 
§ 549 as the Eleventh Circuit did in Delco. The alternative interpretations did 
not bring about the absurd result of punishing the innocent vendor for the 
debtor’s act of using cash collateral without permission.182 
1. Wood Treaters 
In Abbott v. Arch Wood Prot., Inc. (In re Wood Treaters, L.L.C.), a district 
court within the Eleventh Circuit distinguished Delco on comparable facts and 
came to a different conclusion on the avoidance of postpetition transfers of 
cash collateral.183 Instead of looking at the plain meaning of § 549(a), the 
district court focused on the jurisdictional question of whether there was injury 
to the estate.184 
Wood Treaters, L.L.C. filed a chapter 11 petition on March 16, 2009.185 On 
March 18, Wood Treaters obtained permission to operate its business as a 
debtor in possession.186 The court entered orders for the debtor in possession to 
 
 181 See, e.g., Abbott v. Arch Wood Prot., Inc. (In re Wood Treaters, L.L.C.), 479 B.R. 122, 126 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 2012). 
 182 See, e.g., id. at 133. 
 183 See id. at 126. 
 184 Compare Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 
2010) (“Section 549 does not require any analysis of the adequacy of protection of secured creditors’ interests 
nor does it provide a harmless error exception.”), with Wood Treaters, 479 B.R. at 126 (“[T]he [c]ourt may 
consider the issue of injury to the estate in determining whether a trustee may avoid a postpetition transfer 
under § 549(a) . . . .”). 
 185 Wood Treaters, 479 B.R. at 124. 
 186 Id. 
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use the cash collateral of Regions Bank in three different instances.187 Regions 
Bank assigned its claim to 2010 Angelina Capital Fund (Angelina) in April 
2010.188 From May to July of 2010, Wood Treaters purchased products from 
Arch Wood Protection, Inc. in five separate transactions.189 In July 2010, 
Angelina filed a motion to terminate the use of cash collateral based on the 
debtor’s violation of the cash collateral order.190 After the court terminated the 
debtor’s permission to use cash collateral, the case was converted to chapter 
7.191 
The trustee relied on Delco to argue that she was only required to prove the 
three elements of § 549(a): (1) a postpetition transfer was made, (2) of property 
of the estate, (3) that was not authorized by the Code or the Court.192 The 
trustee added that it is “irrelevant” that “the estate received value in exchange 
for the transfer [of cash collateral]” because “injury to the estate is not an 
element under § 549(a).”193 The vendor contended that the trustee lacked 
standing to bring the action because the trustee had not shown that the transfers 
of cash collateral caused injury to the estate.194 The vendor added that the 
estate was not injured because “it received goods of equal value in exchange 
for the transfers.”195 
The district court disagreed with the trustee and stated that the facts from 
Delco were “materially different” from this case and that “the issue of injury to 
the estate was not evaluated by the Eleventh Circuit as a jurisdictional 
question.”196 The court distinguished the case from Delco in two ways.197 First, 
it stated that the debtor in Delco did not have authority from the bankruptcy 
court, nor from the lender, to use its cash collateral and that the debtor spent 
almost $2 million while its motion requesting permission to use cash collateral 
was still pending.198 Second, the court stated that unlike the vendor in Wood 
Treaters, the vendor’s defense in Delco “focused on whether the lender’s 
interest had been adequately protected, and not on whether the estate had been 
 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. at 124–25. 
 190 Id. at 125. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. at 125–26. 
 193 Id. at 125 (citation omitted). 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at 126. 
 197 See id. at 127. 
 198 Id. 
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injured.”199 Due to these differences, the district court said it was not precluded 
by Delco from considering “the question of injury to the estate in determining 
whether the [t]rustee established her avoidance claim under § 549(a).”200 
In determining the question of injury to the estate, the district court noted 
that the Eleventh Circuit did not view this as a jurisdictional question.201 The 
court stated that “[a]ny party who invokes federal jurisdiction ‘bears the 
burden of demonstrating his standing to sue;’” to satisfy the constitutional 
standing requirement, a plaintiff must demonstrate, among other things, that 
there is an “injury in fact.”202 Thus, the court concluded that it may consider 
the question of injury to the estate as a jurisdictional matter under Article III of 
the Constitution because the vendor asserted that the debtor’s payments were 
made in exchange for goods of equivalent value, and due to this, it did not have 
standing to sue.203 
The court also found that the determination of whether there is injury to the 
estate is consistent with the purpose of § 549.204 The court agreed that the 
purpose of § 549 is to “allow the trustee to avoid those postpetition transfers 
which deplete the estate while providing limited protection to transferees who 
deal with the debtor.”205 Additionally, the court held that the “focus of § 549 
and § 550” is on “what the bankruptcy estate lost as a result of the transfer.”206 
The court deemed the question of injury to the estate to be consistent with the 
goals of § 549 because if there is injury to the estate, then the avoidance 
powers of §§ 549 and 550 would be necessary to recover the loss that the estate 
 
 199 Id. The vendor argued that the cash collateral it received did not cause harm to the estate nor to the 
lender because it gave equivalent value in inventory for the funds transferred to it by the debtor. Unlike Wood 
Treaters, the debtor in Delco did not assert that the trustee lacked standing. Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen 
(In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 200 Wood Treaters, 479 B.R. at 127. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. (quoting White v. Whittle (In re Whittle), 449 B.R. 427, 429 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011)). 
Article III of the Constitution provides that federal courts may only hear cases or controversies. 
Standing is an essential part of the case or controversy requirement. The constitutional minimum 
requirements of standing require a plaintiff to demonstrate (1) an injury in fact; (2) that the injury 
is fairly traceable to the alleged misconduct of the defendant; and (3) that a favorable decision is 
likely to redress the injury. 
Id. at 127–28 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
 203 See id. at 128. 
 204 Id. at 129. 
 205 Id. at 128–29 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting ETS Payphones, Inc. v. AT&T Universal 
Card (In re PSA, Inc.), 335 B.R. 580, 584 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005)). 
 206 Id. at 129 (quoting Rushton v. Bank of Utah (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 465 B.R. 226, 233–34 (Bankr. 
D. Utah 2011), aff’d, 477 B.R. 176 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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suffered.207 Thus, the court denied the trustee’s motion for summary judgment 
on the ground that the trustee must prove that the estate suffered an injury that 
is redressable by a judgment in her favor.208 
2. C.W. Mining 
Another post-Delco case that addressed the avoidance of unauthorized 
postpetition transfers is Rushton v. Bank of Utah (In re C.W. Mining Co.).209 
Here, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah looked to the question of 
whether a postpetition transfer of cash to a secured creditor caused injury to the 
estate to determine if the transfer was avoidable under § 549(a).210 The court 
held that unauthorized postpetition transfers of property of the estate should 
not be avoided when the avoidance of such transfers result in zero benefit to 
the estate.211 
C.W. Mining entered into three loan agreements with the Bank of Utah to 
finance the acquisition of mining equipment.212 Each loan agreement was fully 
secured by the equipment and included cross-collateralization provisions 
covering all of the assets secured by any of the notes.213 In January 2008, 
Mining’s creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding under chapter 
11, which was granted on September 26, 2008.214 The chapter 11 proceeding 
was later converted into a chapter 7 proceeding, and a trustee was appointed.215 
After the case was converted to chapter 7, the bank liquidated a certificate of 
deposit in favor of C.W. Mining and obtained $383,099.216 The bank used 
those proceeds and applied them to the notes which the debtor owed.217 Once 
the case was converted to chapter 7, the trustee sought to avoid $383,099 in 
postpetition payments made by C.W. Mining to the Bank of Utah under 
§ 549(a), and to recover that amount under § 550(a)(1) without cancelling the 
satisfaction of the bank’s lien.218 Here, the chapter 7 trustee sought to recover 
 
 207 See id. 
 208 Id. at 130. 
 209 See generally Rushton v. Bank of Utah (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 465 B.R. 226 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011).  
 210 Id. at 231. 
 211 See id. at 234. 
 212 Id. at 229. 
 213 Id. (describing how the provision meant that “all of the assets securing any one of the [n]otes secured 
all of the [n]otes, and the Bank’s security interest was properly perfected”). 
 214 Id. at 229–30. 
 215 Id. at 230. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
 218 See id. 
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the payment made by the debtor to the bank while keeping the reduction of the 
lien that resulted from the bank applying the proceeds from the certificate of 
deposit to the outstanding notes.219 
In analyzing “the consequences of avoiding a transfer to a fully secured 
creditor,” the court noted that it is “critical to recognize that the transfer that 
the [t]rustee seeks to avoid was a payment to a fully secured creditor in 
exchange for satisfaction of a portion of a lien.”220 In other words, the trustee 
sought to keep the money and lift the secured creditor’s lien.221 The court 
found that the result was inequitable and contrary to the purpose of the 
Code.222 This double gain is similar to the windfall evidenced in Delco.223 The 
court criticized such a result by stating that such actions do “not return the 
parties to the status quo, is unrelated to any damages, is clearly punitive in 
nature, and creates a windfall for the bankruptcy estate.”224 
The court was guided in its analysis by the purpose of § 550.225 The court 
acknowledged that § 550(a) is intended to “restore the estate to the financial 
condition it would have enjoyed if the transfer had not occurred,” and that 
focus should be placed on “what the bankruptcy estate lost as a result of the 
transfer.”226 Looking at the consequences if the avoidance was to be awarded, 
the court noted that the avoidance of the payment to the bank would bring the 
same amount of money back into the estate as would be reduced in the bank’s 
lien.227 The court categorized the chapter 7 trustee’s approach as a punitive 
theory of the Code, “which must be rejected.”228 Therefore, by considering the 
purpose of § 550 in light of the facts, the court concluded that it would be 
meaningless to grant judgment to the trustee in the adversary proceeding.229 
 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. at 231. 
 221 See id. 
 222 Id. at 233 (“The Trustee’s attempt to recover the $383,099 Transfer free and clear of the Bank’s lien is 
clearly inconsistent with the intent of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 223 See Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010), 
aff’d, 477 B.R. 176 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012). 
 224 C.W. Mining, 465 B.R. at 231. 
 225 See id. at 233–34. 
 226 Id. at 233 (quoting Rushton v. Drive Fin. Servs. (In re Gardner), No. 05-27551, 2007 WL 2915847, at 
*3 (Bankr. D. Utah Feb. 23, 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 227 Id. at 234. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. 
MENDOZA GALLEYSPROOFS2 3/5/2014 9:10 AM 
2013] AVOIDING THE INEQUITIES OF IN RE DELCO OIL 285 
B. Authority the Court May Use to Create an Exception 
Bankruptcy courts have traditionally been recognized as courts of equity.230 
As such, bankruptcy courts should have judicial authority to prevent the absurd 
result created by the plain meaning interpretation of §§ 549 and 550. In light of 
this, this section explores the extent of the bankruptcy courts’ judicial authority 
to grant an innocent vendor exception under § 549. First, it will examine the 
purpose of § 105 and whether its use can be used to exempt innocent vendors. 
Then, it will examine the way in which critical vendor exceptions were 
created, and the legal support courts have used to issue critical vendor orders. 
Section 105(a) is a general provision that allows for the broad exercise of 
power in the administration of a bankruptcy case.231 It states: 
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary 
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of 
this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest 
shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any 
action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to 
enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of 
process.232 
Section 105 is meant to give bankruptcy courts the necessary power to “take 
whatever action is appropriate or necessary in aid of the exercise of their 
jurisdiction.”233 The status of bankruptcy courts as courts of equity was 
confirmed in United States v. Energy Resources Co., where the Supreme Court 
stated that bankruptcy courts have “broad authority to modify creditor-debtor 
relationships.”234 Nonetheless, the power given to bankruptcy courts under 
§ 105 is limited, because it does not allow a bankruptcy court to ignore other 
provisions of the Code, or the requirements of any other state or federal 
statute.235 
 
 230 2 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 105.01[1] (citation omitted). 
 231 Id. 
 232 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012). 
 233 2 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 105.01 (citations omitted). 
 234 United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990) (citations omitted). 
 235 2 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 105.01 (citations omitted); see In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 791 F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1986)) (stating 
that § 105(a) “does not create discretion to set aside the Code’s rules about priority and distribution; the power 
conferred by § 105(a) is one to implement rather than override. . . . ‘The fact that a bankruptcy proceeding is 
equitable does not give the judge a free-floating discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with his 
personal views of justice and fairness, however enlightened those views may be.’”). 
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Although the boundaries of § 105 are not strictly delineated, an “expansive 
construction [of § 105] is justified” given the broad power vested in 
bankruptcy courts to “reorganize debtors, to afford a fresh start to debtors and 
to distribute funds equitably to creditors.”236 This broad power has been 
verified by the Supreme Court, which stated that “‘[t]he jurisdiction of 
bankruptcy courts may extend more broadly’ in chapter 11 cases than in 
chapter 7 cases.”237 
An important example of how courts have relied on their equitable powers 
to develop bankruptcy law is the critical vendor exception.238 Vendors are 
labeled critical vendors “in the rare instances in which the payment of a 
prepetition debt may be absolutely vital to the reorganization of a [c]hapter 11 
debtor.”239 For example, payment of the prepetition debt may be vital because 
the vendor may offer a good or service whose substitute cannot be located at 
an acceptable price.240 This judicially created exception is one that is made to 
further the goals of the Code and has found support in common law and 
§ 105(a).241 Understanding the mechanism and theory used in granting the 
critical vendor exception is important to demonstrate that bankruptcy courts 
are equipped with the judicial authority to create an innocent vendor exception 
under § 549(a). 
Judicial authority to create a critical vendor exception began under the 
common law doctrine of necessity.242 The “necessity of payment rule” 
recognized the importance of allowing the trustee to pay prepetition debts of 
suppliers who threatened to withhold essential goods or services.243 The 
necessity of payment rule was applied mainly to allow for the survival of 
railroad companies that could not survive without certain suppliers.244 
Today, it seems unlikely that the doctrine of necessity will be used as 
authority to provide critical vendor status.245For example, the Seventh Circuit 
found in In re Kmart that the Bankruptcy Acts of 1898 and 1978 have 
 
 236 2 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 105.01[2]. 
 237 Id. ¶ 105.01 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 310 (1995)). 
 238 Travis N. Turner, Note, Kmart and Beyond: A “Critical” Look at Critical Vendor Orders and the 
Doctrine of Necessity, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 431, 434 (2006). 
 239 See id. at 437 (quoting In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 86 B.R. 922, 932 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988)). 
 240 Id. at 437–38. 
 241 Id. at 446–47. 
 242 See id. at 443–44. 
 243 See id. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. at 445–46. 
MENDOZA GALLEYSPROOFS2 3/5/2014 9:10 AM 
2013] AVOIDING THE INEQUITIES OF IN RE DELCO OIL 287 
displaced common law doctrines such as that of the doctrine of necessity.246 
Moreover, the court added that “[o]lder doctrines may survive as glosses on 
ambiguous language enacted in 1978 or later, but not as freestanding 
entitlements to trump the text.”247 
Although § 105(a) has been restricted in some circuits, such as the Seventh 
Circuit, it has received a more liberal treatment in other circuits.248 A recent 
example of a more liberal construction occurred in the Third Circuit.249 The 
District Court of Delaware stated in In re Just for Feet, Inc. that the “Supreme 
Court, the Third Circuit and the District of Delaware all recognize the court’s 
power to authorize payment of prepetition claims when such payment is 
necessary for the debtor’s survival during chapter 11.”250 Here, the court 
referred to the necessity of payment doctrine, noting that although it is not 
codified, the equitable power given to courts still exists under § 105(a).251 The 
district court also referred to the origins of the necessity of payment doctrine 
and how it aimed to “[recognize] that paying certain [prepetition] claims may 
be necessary to realize the goal of chapter 11.”252 
In re CoServ L.L.C. is another case in which a court construed § 105(a) 
liberally.253 In this case, the District Court for the Northern District of Texas 
searched for a provision of the Code “that would make the issuance of a 
critical vendor order necessary to carry out the purposes of the Code.”254 
Another case in which a court considered the equitable nature of a bankruptcy 
court is In re Chateaugay Corp.255 In this case, the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York held: 
A rigid application of the priorities of § 507 would be inconsistent 
with the fundamental purpose of reorganization and of the Act’s grant 
of equity powers to bankruptcy courts, which is to create a flexible 
 
 246 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 247 Id. (citations omitted); see also Turner, supra note 238, at 446. 
 248 Turner, supra note 238, at 447–49. 
 249 See id. at 449. 
 250 In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 825 (D. Del. 1999). 
 251 See id. at 824. 
 252 Id. at 825 (citation omitted). 
 253 In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).  
 254 Turner, supra note 238, at 449–50. 
 255 See generally Mich. Bureau of Workers’ Disability Comp. v. Chateaugay Corp. (In re Chateaugay 
Corp.), 80 B.R. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
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mechanism that will permit the greatest likelihood of survival of the 
debtor and payment of creditors in full or at least proportionately.256 
Further, with respect to the application of pre-plan proceedings required by 
§ 1122,257 the court added, “[T]he fact that the bankruptcy courts are courts of 
equity . . . allows exceptions to any strict rules of classification of claims.”258 
Given that § 105 has been used to make “exceptions to any strict rules of 
classification of claims” and to further the goals of the Code, it seems 
reasonable that courts can use § 105 to create an exception for innocent 
vendors in situations where they receive cash collateral in exchange for goods 
of equivalent value.259 
VI.  PROPOSED INNOCENT VENDOR EXCEPTION 
The proposed innocent vendor exception would have prevented the 
inequity resulting from Delco.260 First, it prevents the problem of having the 
innocent vendor lose the money received even though the estate and the 
creditor were not harmed.261 By preventing the avoidance of the debtor’s 
postpetition payment to the innocent vendor, the court would effectively avoid 
this problem, because the chapter 7 trustee could not bring an avoidance action 
under § 549(a) to repair harm made to a secured creditor.262 Second, it avoids 
the absurd result that arises when an innocent vendor is prevented from 
obtaining an administrative expense claim even though it conferred a benefit 
 
 256 Id. at 287. 
 257 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2012) states: 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a plan may place a claim or an interest in 
a particular class only if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims or 
interests of such class. 
(b) A plan may designate a separate class of claims consisting only of every unsecured claim that 
is less than or reduced to an amount that the court approves as reasonable and necessary for 
administrative convenience. 
 258 Chateaugay, 80 B.R. at 288 (quoting Brinkley v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. & Realty Trust (In re 
LeBlanc), 622 F.2d 872, 879 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
 259 Id. (quoting LeBlanc, 622 F.2d at 879). 
 260 See generally Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 
2010). 
 261 In a case like Delco, the estate would recoup the cash collateral paid to the vendor and the goods 
received. See id. at 1262. By virtue of U.C.C. § 9-315, the creditor should have a security interest in the goods 
for which the debtor exchanged the cash collateral. U.C.C. § 9-315 (2001). 
 262 But see Delco, 599 F.3d at 1260 (permitting the trustee to bring an avoidance action). 
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on the estate.263 Third, it allows equitable remedies to come into play to help 
police the debtor’s unauthorized use of cash collateral.264 The court may assign 
sanctions or penalties against the debtor or its officers, and may assign 
replacement liens or super priority status on newly unencumbered property in 
order for the secured creditor to maintain an interest similar to that which it 
had in the cash collateral.265 More importantly, these results are equitable 
because they prevent the innocent vendor, as an innocent transferee, from 
being punished for the debtor’s misconduct and allows the appropriate 
sanctions to involve both the debtor and the corresponding creditor. 
Through analysis of the critical vendor exemption, this Comment has 
shown that courts do have the authority to create an innocent vendor judicial 
exception to avoid the absurd results of decisions such as Delco. Also, courts 
would not be stepping over the § 105 boundaries because previous courts have 
created broader exceptions than the exception proposed in this Comment. 
Alternatively, as illustrated by Wood Treaters and C.W. Mining Co., creating 
an exception in this narrow instance may not even require the use of § 105. 
CONCLUSION 
To avoid the negative implications that resulted from Delco, courts should 
create an exception for innocent vendors under § 549(a) who transact with 
debtors that are using cash collateral without proper authorization. This 
exception should apply when the vendor is innocent and when it exchanges 
equivalent value for the received cash collateral. Delco showed that when 
§ 549(a) is interpreted according to its plain meaning, certain absurd results 
occur: (1) the innocent vendor loses the payment it received from the debtor 
even though it transacted goods in return, and (2) the innocent vendor’s 
opportunity to obtain an administrative expense claim pursuant to § 503 of the 
Code is jeopardized by the mechanics of § 502(h).266 Additionally, this 
Comment has demonstrated that the burden the decision places on vendors is 
too high, as vendors have to spend resources and delay transactions in order to 
 
 263 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(h) (2012). By virtue of § 502(h), the vendor loses priority in its claim since the 
transfer was recovered via § 550. Thus, what would have been an administrative expense claim becomes a 
prepetition unsecured claim. 
 264 See Polednak, supra note 31, at 346–47. 
 265 See id. at 347 & nn.24–25 (citations omitted) (summarizing case law using remedies derived from the 
Code and from other areas of law). 
 266 Delco, 599 F.3d at 1263. 
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conduct due diligence and avoid the same fate that Marathon suffered in 
Delco.267 
Furthermore, the policies and legislative history behind §§ 549 and 550, 
when combined with the goals of chapter 11, support the creation of an 
innocent vendor exception.268 The purpose of sections §§ 549 and 550, to 
repair any harm that was inflicted on the estate by a postpetition transfer, is 
consistent with the creation of an innocent vendor exception, because the 
exception will only apply in instances where the estate suffered no harm as a 
result of the postpetition transfer of cash collateral.269 The legislative history of 
§§ 502 and 550 have shown that the legislature,270 in drafting the current 
sections of the Code, did not foresee that the avoidance of a postpetition 
transfer under § 549(a) would create a conflict with an innocent vendor’s 
priority under § 502(h) by turning a potential administrative expense claim into 
a prepetition unsecured claim.271 
This exception will prove useful in the near future for a few reasons. First, 
it adheres to the interests that § 550 is meant to protect—unauthorized transfers 
which result in loss to the estate. Second, it protects good faith vendors who 
run the risk of losing not only their shipment of goods, but also the 
corresponding payment that comes with it. More importantly, this exception is 
consistent with the goals of chapter 11 because it increases the likelihood that a 
debtor’s reorganization will be successful. Without the exception, vendors may 
refuse to work with chapter 11 companies, as they could not be guaranteed 
payments for their goods. 
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